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RECENT IMPoRTANT DECISIONS 
~t P0ss.:Ss1~N-PosSESs10N IN 0.NI CouNTY C.um:s Posm;SIOx 
'JO CJ.AniE;J> BouNJ>.un:s IN ANOTHD ColJNTY.~ln an acti0n of ejectment 
for a tract of' land lying in tw~ CoUJlties, ~e defmda!lt claim~ title ·ht 
adverse PQS~ession under colOI' of tiale. The question was w1iether actual 
possessfon in one cowity w~4 · give constructive possessio? in the other 
county. He~ since the enactment of Section·~ Civil Code, allowina an 
action for the recovery of real property to be brought ·in the county in which 
the land ·Jie), ot aD)' part thereof, actual possessi.on in one.conn~. pcs con-
structive possession in· the other:. Bmxs v. Blackln#m, 225 ·s.- W. ~ (~ .. 
1930). . 
Prior to the above provision, when the action of ejectment must have beaJ 
brought ~ the county in T(hich the land la)', actual P<>ssession in oneo county 
under CQ!or of title to a tract of land lying in . two counties UI not aive 
constructive possession in the other. Hord.;: Walln-,~s Litt. 22 '(Ky., lSzi): 
SQad" 'v. McMilln Heirs, 4 Dana 456-.(Ky .. 1836). The court undoubtedt,,. 
considered ·itself Justified in· refus~ to extend the Construcfive possession 
beyond the• county ·in· 1Vnich tllere !iU actual possession, upon the lfOU11d 
that ejectmerit ~d only be brought against one in actual possession. If 
such were the case, a ·disseizee would lose his seisin in tbe county in which 
the disseiaor had only a constructive JY.)ssession, but would at no time durin&' 
the statutory period be. able to r.ecoVe:r posstnion. .An adverse posstsSor 
under Color of .title,. in actJJal poss~ori of a part and claiming to the ex.tent 
of th~ boµudaiies embraced in his ~eed; ~y.· oov.:cver, .bnng ejectment for a 
dispossession of ~ part of the tract over whicli lie had oply a constructive 
possession. Hi&ks v. ColetJJars. 25 cat· 122 ~1864). He may also bring tres· 
pass under the same circumstances. ~ark.er v~. Wallis, 6o Md. 15 (1882): 
Wel.ils v. Lowis, 31 Ilt 446•(1863). Both ejectment and trespass, q. c. f., lie 
fot injuries to a possessor}r-right. It seems; therefore, .that if one can. main-
tain cjectment and trespass for tlie invasion of a constructive possession that 
-ejectmcnt will lie agaiMI one who has. only a constructive possession. As 
a disseizee would thus be able to reeover his. possessicm . in both cc;unties. 
.there seems .to be ~o ·sound ·r~on for saying that the same rule slio!!ld not 
apply to a ~ of land lying in two' counties that apply to a tract of land 
lying in ose county •. In Hord v. Walin', su/ra, the court for authoz:ity retied 
on Coke's statemcilt that to revest seisin in a tract of land lying in two 
counties there muu be a reentry in each-count).. CoEE ON l.nT. 252 b. But 
Coke was disctissing seisin-, not possession. It is submitted that the court in 
the principal case might have arrived at the same conclusion in the absence 
of_ariy statutory"provision relating tO ejectmcnt.· 
Ass1GNJ1£NTS-1NsTRucnoN ~ DE8'1'0R 'tO PAY D£B't m Tam PiisoN.-
A father told ·his soris that if they would pay the unpaid purchase money 
debt evidenced by bonds he would gjve them his farm to belonc to them 
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after his death. The son~ promised to pay the debt. Thereupc;n the father 
roide a will devising to the rons the farm charged with the debt The father 
himself paid part of the debt before his death and informed the sons that 
they were indebted to him in ·the amount paid. T~1e sons admitted the debt 
and offered to pay the -father, but "the latter refused payment, saying that he 
wanted them to pay it to his daughters. The !"ons agreed with the father. 
that they would· pay the daughters. H el4, a .gratuitous equitable assignment 
to the daughters which reinained executory and could not be given effect. 
Poff v. Poff (Va., 1920). 104 S. E. 719-
The court thought that the transaction was not iutcnd~d to operate as 
a transfer in trust. Compare Russdl's }!~tc11tors v. Pas.'1norc. (Va., 193ci'I, 
io3 S. E. 6s2; 19 MtcH. L. REV. 420.' If intended to take effect· as an equitable 
assignment, it must of course he executed to be binding upqn the donor's 
estate. An executed gift was thought impossible becaul'e there was nQ docu-
mentary evidence of the debt. See ScoTT's CAsES ON TllusTs, 168, note. 
And of course an executory gift couJd not be.given effect as a declaralior. 
of trust. See·ibid.; 151, note. Would.it have ~n possible, however, to decree 
a constructive trust on the theory that· the father refrained from addinJ a 
codicil to his will in reliance upcn the sons' promise to pay the daughters: 
S1:e Ahui1s v. Jo11es; 16g N. Y. 555; 13"Coi.u:?11B. L. RE\·. 343- • 
CARRIERS-TH~ Cox:iaODJTlts Ct.Aust OF THE HEPBURN ACT • ....:ln a sliit 
i.o dissol\'e .the intercorporate reiations 1'etwcen the Lehigh Valley Railroid 
Co., the Lehigh Valley Coal Co., and the Lehigh Valley Sales Co. as a com-
bination in restraint of trade in violation of the Anti-Trust Act, and also as 
transporting coal over the line of the defendant's. railroad in violation of the 
commodities clause of the Hepburn Act, it was shown that the ~oal com-
pany and the railroad company agreed to the organization of the sales com-
pany, limiting subscriptions to the stock of the ~les company to the stock-
.holders of the railroad company. The officer!i and directors of the three coin-
j>anies were so· interlocked as to result practically in one management. The 
coat company contracttd to sell all of its coal to the sales company. Held, 
that the arrangement "was a mere dC\·ice to evade the-commodities clause of 
the Interstate Commerce Act, and therefore. void.., Case remanded to the 
District Court with instructions to enter a decree dissolving the combination 
effected.· V. S. v. Lel1igh Valley R. Co. cu; S •• Dec., 1920), 41 Sup. Ct. 104-
And so comes to grief lJ.nother attempt to take advantage of the illusive 
bope held out by Mr. Justice White in U. S. v. D. & H. Co,, 213 U. S. J(i6. 
in which it was said"·the inhibitions did not include.·"articles .or commodities 
manufactured. mined, produced or owned by a bona fid~ corporation in 
which the railroad company is a ~toekholder." ·Events have abundantly justi-
fied thi: prediction of J1,1stice Harlan in his di~sent that if this were permitted 
it would be a device to evad~ the law: Justice, now Chief Justice, White 
preser.vcs his consistency, for· in this Ca.cc, is in U. S. v. R.:a4rng C<>., 40 Sur~ 
Ct. 425, re\·iewed ·in ~lieu. L. R£V., a11fc, pa~e 22J, he disi;ents from the d.oc:-
trine, though now he concurs with the decision as settled law. Fourteen years 
h3\'C passeCJ, an~: stilt the railroads are tryhii out devices, and perhaps they 
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can aff~d to continue the trials as Jong as the courts do not penalize them 
for violation of the statute. This docs not make respect for law, and pos· 
sibly it misht have been better fot all concerned if the court had at QJlCe 
insisted that the nulroad must completely separate itself from the mining 
and selling of coal. · Apparently. all the ·stock in ;m independent coal company 
might have·been sold to· stockholdtts of.the railroad coippany, provided the 
new company had ~ actually i_ndependcnt and free from any control by 
the corporation owning- and operating the railroad. By .this time much of 
such stock ·would ha.ve changed hands, .so that the stockholders of the two 
companies would have been far from identical. This the railroad companies 
eviden~Jy did not, and do not, desire. ·How ~ they let go, and also keep 
hold, seems the problem th~ are stiJI trying to solve. How long wiJJ the 
courts give them to work on it? For previous notes on the various attempts 
made, sec Lf MICH. L..Rtv. 49. 19 Mica:L. R&v. 221. 
CoHsTITtm<JHAI. LAw~AJt RusT I.Aw VJJ.m Ex!RCIS£ oP TB£ Poua 
Po~--Thc legislature of.":Vuginia ~ssed ~ha~ is known as the Cedar Rust 
Law: providing for the destruction. of red . cedar trees to prevent infe~on 
of adjacent apple orchards. The state entomologist was required to make a 
prCliminary inv~tfgation. If he ordered the trees cut down, the own'! was 
allowed an appeal to tbe circuit court of the county where the trees were 
located. The trees could not be destroyed until such hearing was finished. 
The aet also provided for compensation to be paid to the owner of the 
.destro7ed trees. This appeal was brought as provided for by the statute, and 
·the owners ·assailed the constitutionality of the act on the ground that it was 
a taking of property ·without due process· of Jaw. Held, a valid e.-tercisc of· 
the police po~. Bowman v. 'Yirginia State ~ntomologist (Va., 1920), IoS 
s. E. Lp. . . ·. ·: . . . . 
The Fou~th Amendment to the Federal Constitutian was not designed 
to interfere with the power of the state to prescribe regulations-to promote 
the health, ~ morals, education and good order of the people~ and to 
legislate so as t<> increase tlie industries of the state, develop its resources, 
and add to its wealth and prosperity. Barbier v. ConMDlly. 113 U. S. ~. 
Th&e are, of coarse, limits-beyond which such .Jegisiation cannot legally go. 
If the ;tct, therefore, has no real or substantial relation to the above obj~ 
or if it is a. palpable in~ion of rights secured by the fundamental law, lhe 
courts may, and it is their duty so to adjudge, and thereby give effect to the 
coostitution. · Mwgkr v. Kanmz, Ja3 U. S. 623. But the legislature is allowed 
a wide range of discretion in the matter, because, being fanu1iar with local 
conditions, it is primarily the judge· of the necessity of such enactments. 
Unless the act in question is unmistakably and palpably in excess of the 
legtslative power there is no ground for judicial interference. Meua,. v. 
ArkaJl$CJS, 211 U .. S. 539- In the instant case it wu clearq for the p~lic 
in~est that apple orchards should bC protect~ It is _not a case of injury 
to human beings in the same proportion as is the menace "of Jiuman ·disease. 
but the principles involved ·are the same ~ both instances. ·A irreat IDaJJ7 
statutes have been passed by Congress and the state lcgislattues, in th~ ~er-
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cise of the police power, for preventing dis"se among animals. The decisions 
arc based on the effect of the disease on the animal industrY itself. Sec note· 
to 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1o66, and cases therein cited. So also have statut~ 
been passed to prevent and eradicate diseases among agricultural growths of 
various sorts, including 9rchards. See. State "'· Boelsm, 92 Minn. 374. where 
a statute. which forbade owners from letting certain weeds go to seed was 
upheld. In Balch .v. Glen.-, 85 Kan. ;35, a statute was involved which pro. 
vided · for t.he extermination of the San Jose scale and other orcliard pests. 
!t was held that that was an appropriate exercise .of t1ie police power. For 
other statutes of a sirililar nature. which have been held constitutional, see 
State v. Nelsox, 22 S. D. 23_; Stale v. Alain, 69 Conn-. 123; Colvill v. Fos, 51 
Mont. ;2; Louisiana State Board v. Ta11.:mann1 140 La. 756,' and Los Angeles 
Co. v. Spencer, 126 Cal. 6;o. It was not necessary to the validity of the 
statute in the instant case that compensation be provided. Commonwtaltls 
v. Alger, ; Cush. (Mass.) 53· Neither is i.he statute invalid because certain 
persons derive speaal benefit from it, so long as alt .persons subject to it arc 
treated aliJcc under the same cond.itions.. Barb{cr v. Corrnol:y, supra. 
CoNSTITUTIONAI. LAw-CoNsTrn.-noNAUTY oF STATG'n: ro CoNsnn: NA'f'-
.l'R.\L GA$.-A statute of Wyoming declares that the use of natural gas for 
products wh~rc the gas is burned withollf the· heat being futty and actually 
applied for other manufacturing or domestic purposes is wasteful and shall 
be unlawful when the gas well is" tocated within ten inlles of any town or 
industrial plant. It" is aimed, very evidently; at the carbon black indu~try. 
The plaintiff, a carbon black company, c:Ontcnding that·the statute was beyond 
the police power of the state and is discriminatory. sought an injunction to 
prevent the officers of the stall' fro; .. enforcing the act. Held, the !lt:itute is 
·"·ithin the police power of the state, and 'injunction rduttd. Walls ti. al. v. 
Midland Carbon Co. el al. (U.S. Sup. Ct., 1920), 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. ·us. 
The first problem in the principal case i!- the determination of whether the 
conservation of natural gas or the prohibition of its wastt' is within the· 
police power of the state or i$ an arbitrary interference "with private rights. 
The nature of gas is peculiar. Unlike other minerals; it possesses 'he "power 
to move about. It has· been held that the owners of the surfact- over a· g-.. s 
field;. white they have the exclusive right on· their Ian ti-to sink wells for the 
purpose of extracting oil and· gas, have no right of propefly therein unb1, 
by actuatly bringing the oil and gas to the surfa,ce, they have reduced these 
to physical possession. Toninsend v. State, 14; Ind. 624. But !Ice 18 M1cu. 
L Rzy •. 463, ct seq. The use by one surface owner affects the USC of other 
owners and an excessive use by one diminishes the use by others. Hence it 
has been held' that the police power of ttie sta~c can be exercised for the 
purpose of protecting all the cotlecth-·e owners, by securing & just distribution 
of their prh-itege to reduce. to possessiOn and to reach the. same end by ptt-
venting waste: Ohio 'Oil Co. v. lndiona, 1;; U. S. 190. Moreover, ·the public 
as welt as the surface owners have an interest to prevent the· waste of oil 
arUl gas, because in the preservation of these the welt-being and prosperlt)' 
of the entire community is largely involved. Toumstml v. Staie, .ntro.. A 
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aumbu of states have enacted legislation for the conservation of· their natural 
resoµrces, which has been held constitutional. An_ Indiana statute proln"'bitcd 
the waste· of gas or oil by escape f~om the well for more than two da~ 
·aftei: the gas or oil had been struck. Ohio· Oil Co. v. l11diarsa, nJWa. A 
statute. passed in New York for the preservation of mineral· springs prohib-
ited the pumping. of mineral water· to use in lhe manufacture of .:arbonic 
acid gas. Lindsay v. Nat. Carbonic Gas ~o., 220 U. · S. 61~ A Cal!fomia 
stattite for the ·prevention of waste of artesian waters"provided that an 
uncapped well was a nuisance. Es J!arle ElanJ, 6 CaL App. 233- A New 
Mexico statute to prevent the waste of artesian Waters declared a well, ~ow­
ing Without restriction and with a waste of water, to· be a nuisance, and· pro-
vided for its abat.cment. Eccles v. Ditto, ·23 N. M. 235- But see.Heer ·v. 
Merkel, 117 WiS. 368. Th~ Maine ~.urt conildered ntid a proposed statute 
.for the prevention of fresl;\cts and droughts by .the regulation and 'S'estric:tion 
of the cutting of young trees on wild lands, w.hen no bendicial use was to 
be ·mad~ of the trees or the land.· Ol!ini0ts of the JfUficu, 103 He. ,so6. In 
the priai:iplil case the plaintiff contended that the dtatute dcp~ him of 
hiS property without due process of law. He· showed that carbon could not 
be made without dissipation of the heat eVolved. that DO ot1icr USC could be 
"made of his·ptani and gas_weJL If. ho~~er, there is a proper police purpose, 
a reasonable relation betwecil the means used and the accomplishment of 
that pufP.OSe. and a valid classifieation. the statute is a proper exercise of the 
police power of the State; even though it 'results in dCP.riving the owner of 
all beneficial use of his property. . The purpose of the statute in the- prin..' 
cipal case. the prevention of waste of natural ias. is within the police power 
f>f the state-the promotion of the ecnera! welfare and prosperity. Ohio Oil 
Co. v. JndiaflO, ntra. 'l'he means chosen in this cue arc reasonable to 
:iccomplish such purpo5e. The inefficiency of the carbon black industry is 
yery high. Preventing such wastdui mctliods. coilscrve5 the gas_ supply. The 
statute i.s not wiconstitutional ~ depriving the owner of his property without 
due process of law. The classification in the statute is ·made upon a reasonable 
basis, not arbitrarily. It exceptS from· its operation any gas well more than 
ten miles from a town or industry. The ground for such provision being 
that a well that distance from a town .. would not interfere with the supply 
of gas from •hich the town drew. A classification having some reasonable 
basis does not offend apinst the equal protection of the laws clause merely 
btcause it Js not.· made ·with mathematical ~~ Lindst!y v .. Carbo11ic Gu 
Co., npa. Acts foe the conservation of natural resotirces are within the 
puiposcs of tbe police power of the. state and are man commendable. The 
statute llcrc prevents the production Qf a commodity whose ineVitable effect 
was td exhaust the gas supply· lhortly. 
CoMSTITUTIONAL LAw-Dowa NO't A "Puvu.zct ~ Ix11uNriY" WITBI1' 
1'Bi CoNS'lTtUTJOK.-A ~atute limited the right to dower in lands within. the 
state iri case or non-residcms to tands· of which the ·husband died seized. 
This was attacked as abri~ the "privileges or immunities" of Btizens, 
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but held constitutional. Ferry v. S/okaM, ·p. 6' S. Ry. Co. ti al (C. C. A., 
9th Circ., 1920), ·268 Fed. 117. · . ·. 
The decision here can. be sustained upon the principle of public poliq 
that the court reasonably assumes was the basis for the adoption of the statute . 
in 1854- The pattern statute ·was ~sed· in Michigan in 1846, which was 
first· interpreted that the" non-residence. was to be at the time of husband's 
death. Pratt v. Tept; 14 Mich. 191. It was later construed to be as at the 
time of conveyance'. Ligare v. SetJ\Ple, 32 Mich. 438. Wisconsin and.Nebraska 
also· adopted the Michigan statute and the later interpretation given it. Eke· 
gren y. J.fareolle, 159 Wis. 539; Atkins v. Atkins, 18 Neb. 474- In Kansas a 
similar statute specifically states that.the ~on-r:esidence is to be the time of 
death, § 2942- Now the state.11 ar~ knit closer: together by means oi rapid 
intercommunication, so that the difficulty of obtaining the wife's signatutt 
is greatly lessened. There will be cases of actual injumce, but it ii bettu 
that the vendee should always get a clear title when he buys from one whose 
marital circumstances he cannot team than .that he should never be sure of 
his title until after . the vendor's death the Statute of Limitations has run. 
.. It is against public policy .to allow.resfraints to be put upon transfers which 
public policy does not forbid." Also, it is a recognized principle of law that 
the dispO!iition of. unmovable property 'is exclusively subject to the govem-
.ment ·within wh~.jurisdi~tion the property is situated. U. S. ·.,. Fo.~. 94 
U. S. 31s. The constitutionality has been. question<Cl seVeral times and the 
statUtes always have been held goOd, and property so· for the reasons above 
pointed out. Not all of thes~ ar~mentiOOed by the court, wbiCb relies 1argeJy · 
upon. citation of authority •. The eoinment of the c:ourt upon part of the 
:appellant;s argu.mCnt is, besides ci-roneous, v.ery apt io be misleading as ·to 
'the basis of the decision. · The reason the law, by wbicli' a state imposes upon 
citizens.of another state a tax•upon their right of inheritance, which it does 
-not impose upon· its own -citizens, is invalid, is 'that it conflicts with U. S. 
.R.£v. ST., Sec; 1978. !;, re .Stanfllr(s "Estate, s4 Pac. 259- I~ is not ~ the 
right of inheritance' is more fundamental than the right of dower. The right 
-of inheritance is not a natural and Diherent right. Dawson :v. Godfrey, 4 
Cranch 321; Knowlto,..·v. M o(We, 178 U. S. 41; Cr.one v. Reeder, 21. Mich. 2.f. 
For other cases, see 9 LR. A. {N. S.) 121. Nor is the right of dower 3 · 
iiatural right. but it is founded on the law. Ranclali v. Kreiger, 23. Watt 137. 
Other cases will be tound cited in 9 R. C. ·t. s63- Thus, wln1c beth inheri-
tance and dower arc favored by the law; both are creatures 'of the law ~d 
stand on the same footing, so neither, as such, iS "privileges or immunities" 
and protected by the constitution. The invalidity of th~ Jaw concerning the 
inher~tance tax was based· upon siatute. Thus, though the· dida of 'the case 
are wrong and .~onfuSing, 'the decision itself is correct. 
CoNSTITUTIONAr. LA.w-l{ANSAS AKTI-a~ LA.w.-The act makes it 
unlawful to ~er, sell er gfve away cigarettes or cigarette papers and also 
unla.wfal to k~ them in a store or other place for barter; sale or free dis-
tn1>ution, . It .provides 1}iat Upon FoPer""COmPiaint thenl may be a search for 
ind seizure and confiscation of s~ articles found. There is also a·prcrrision 
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that the. possession of the proluoited article Shall be considered 1rimo fade 
evi4ence of a viola~ion of the act. ·The defendant was convicted of both 
selling and keeping of the prohibited articles. He appeals on the ground that 
the act violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment.·· Held, the act is within the police power of the state and 
does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Stale v. NossamatJ (Kan. 
1921>), 193 Pac. 347. 
- 1t bas been held that the restriction or proluoition of the sate of cigar-
ettes by a state,· for the protection of the public. health and welfare, is within 
. the police power. Asutfo v. Tennessee, 179 U. S. Ji3; Cook v. Jlarslsall 
Co11nty, lowa, 196 V. S. 261; see als0 4 Mica; L. Rn-. 14 · There is sufficient 
ground. for the cla~sificati0n by the tCgislature of cigarettes from other. forms 
of tol>acco, as being a special menace to the health and welfare of the people. 
G11~dli11g v. Chicago, l'/1 U .. S: 183- In the principal Case the defendant con-
t~~C!l that the provision of th~ sta~te" ~g possession of cigarette inate-
~ls prjma .f acie evidence of a violation is a denial of due process. "That a 
1~ presumption 9f one_ fact from .evidence of another may not constitute 
a denial of .~iie process of la~ or ·a denial of equa! protection of the laws, 
. it is only essential thit .there .shall be some rational connection between the 
fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and that" the mference of one 
fa.ct from the proof of uOtbtr shall Jl'Ot be sO. unreasonable as to be a purely 
arbitrary mandate.... Mo~, .f. & K. C~ R. Co. v. TtmsiP•ed, 219 t.J. S. 3s. 
sustaining .a statute ~ injuriC! inflicted by the ~g of trains lrifM 
fat:ie evidence of negligence on ~~ part of the railroads.. The prima ·tam 
rule of .evidence in the principal case complies ;with the above requirements. 
. The inference of a viola~ o~ the ~~te from proof of possession is not 
so unreasonabl~ as •to be arbitrary. 'rhere is an admmistrative· necessity. for 
such a iµle of evidence. witli what intent.or purpose the accused 1w cigar-
ettes in his pos$cssion D a mattct peculiatly withm bis knowledge. If bis 
purpose-·is not unlawful he _may ~ily rebut the inference, while the state 
:Would nnd it almost impossible to prove an ui:alawful purpose. When a state, 
exerting its reCognized authority, "undertakes to. suppress what it D free to 
reprd as a public evil, it may adopt sueb meamrcs ha~ reasonable rela-
tion to that end a$ it may deem necessary in order to mali:e its action effective. 
PNril:y B.rlrtKI & Tonic Co, v.1Lynch, 226 U.S. 192- As said in SI. Jo'/in .... 
New.York, ao1. U. S. 633, "No.t only the final puipQse of the ·law must be 
considered, but the.means o~ its administration-the ways it "may be defeated. 
;Legislation to t>e practical and efficient must regard this special purpose as 
well as the ultimate purpose." See also Silz· v. Hesterb"p, 211 P'. S. _31. 
CoNsnTUTIONAI. LAw.:...PRivri.Ects AND Ixxu:r.-nus-1.IKITATioN Omv 
l11'0N. STt\TE LAw.-Defendants were indicted for forciWy transporting a 
~unilicr of ·person~"(>Ut of the State of" Arizona and warning them against 
refuni.ini by threats of violence. Held, no violation· of .the "priv11cges and 
immunities" clause of· the· Federal Constitution (Art.. W, SeC. 2). a5 this 
section is directed only against state action. and not against that of incUrid• 
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uals.. United States v. Wbeiler d aL (U. S. Sup. Ct., 1920), October tenm; 
Case No. 68. · · . 
The r~ht of a ci*eri of one state to d'well peacefully in any other state 
and to ha~e free ingress to and .. gress from such ·other state is unqu~ 
ably o_ne of the privileges and immunities guaranteed by Article IV, Section 
.2 oI the Federal Constitution. .Paul v. Virgin4a, 8 Wall 168. Such a·rilbt 
existed by virtue of comity between the state_s even before the ado.ptioa of 
the Constitution. AliTICr.ES OF CoNFEDUATION~ Article IV. And bas since 
been repeatedly included by· the courts in the categoty of ~s prottcited 
by the privileges and immu.nities clause. .PaHl v. Virginia; ~lro; Wm v. 
MarJlhnd, 12 Wall. 418; Slmlghter House Cases, 16 Wall "36; CorfieW Y. 
Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 371. The question mvolved in. the principal cue is 
whether the inhibition of this clause extends tO indi'ri~ action in. dercp-
tion of tl}e rights described, or merely applies to acts by the states thenuehes. 
~n holding that the limitation is only upon state ae\ion th~ court 'relies upoa 
the authority of United States v. Harris, Jo6 U. S .. 629. In that case the 
question was fairly raised by' an attack upon.the constitutionality of a fed-
eral statute (R. S., Sec. 5519) punishing by"fine or imprisonment aDj two 
or more.persons who· should· "conspire or go in disguise upon ~e hlg1nra,r 
or on the premises of another. for the purpose of depriving • • •· ~ ~ 
or class of persons • • • of equal privileges or immunities under the-. Jaws." 
In holding .that there was no aqthorization for tbiS statute to be foulia. ill 
Article 1V,. Section 2 of the Federal Constitution, Mr. Justice Woods,. speak-
ing for ttie court. said: "But this ·s.ection. like the Fourteenth Amencimmt; 
is directed against 'State action. . Its object is to place .the citizens of adl 
state upon the same footing with eitizem of' other Stat~. and' inhibit disc:rim-. 
inatlve legislation against them by other stat~ .Citing Pa11l Y. Vir~ 
supra. AU that Paul ""· Virginia' decided with respect to Article IV; Scctiol:l 
2, was that ~orporations were not citizens within ihe:meaning of Jhat clause. 
Nor ~loes the view ann·ounced find any support in the Slat19hier_Hot11.6 CCl#I. 
except by way of dicta. Further, there is sufficient difference in the wonting 
of the article in. question and the Fourteenth: Amendment to ·warrant the 
conclusion that a greater power was delegated to the Federal Government in 
the for=roer than in the latter. In· view of the more general pbra~eoloSY of 
the article involved it seems that it might reasonably bC construed to be an 
express delegation of full power to the Fedetal GGtcrnment to protect W 
privileges and immunities of the citizens of the-s~v~ states as ·weli against 
infringement by other cjtizens as by the stales themselves .. Such a constr:uc-
tion wouid &l no violence to the language used, and ·Would, it seems, render 
more complete and effective the protection of the fundamcntaf rights which 
are sought to be safeguarded. · 
. . 
CoNTRACTs-llir.xvnv .IN INsTALLilEN'rs-R£5Ciss10N JusT1mt> BY NoN-
P~YMENT OF INSTALLMENT.-The plaintifi'i: assignor agreed to sell and the 
deferidant agreed to buy a quantity.of paper to be delh·ered in installments. · 
the terms of payment being "3%-30 days.., The defendant failfd to pay for 
one of the installments as it ~me due, and the seller refused to make further 
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deliveries. Held, ~ch a breach of the contract as justified tht" sencr•1 refusal 
to ~ further deliveries. Auer l!r Twit<helf v. Robp"lsotJ Poper C11. (Vt., 
1921>), Ill AtL 510-
It is settled by the weiglit of authority in this country that in: contracts 
for the we: of commodities to be delivered in insta11ments, the price to be 
~id on uelivery or at fixed periods, default in payment of one of the install-
ments, which is not".waived by the se11er, justifies the :>ther I>arty in rescind-
ing the contract and refusing to make further deliveries. Har-Rs Lvmfiu. ~­
v. Whetl.·r Lumber Co., 88 Ark. 491 ;·Baltimore v. SchaNb Bros., g6 Md. 534; 
Ross-Meehan Foundry.Co. v. Ro)•er Wheei Co., 113 Tenn. 370. Generally the 
~ rules apply where there is a failure to deliver in accor~ with the 
terms of the contract. Cleveland Rolling Mills v. Rhodrs, 121 U. S. 2ss. 
M o"isori v. Leiser, 77 Mo. Api). 95· Though some cases have made a dis-
tinction between defaults by the buyer and defaults by the seller. Norrilsglo11 
v. Wright, i1s U. S. 188.. The minority rule. which is that of the English 
courts. holds that such a default in payment will not justify .rescission by the 
seller unless there was an intent on the part of the buyer to rep:idiate the 
whole contract. West v. Bdchell# 125 Mich. 144 (containing an uh3ustive 
re,·iew of the English authorities) ; iJeotty v. Hawe Lwfflber Co., 77 Minn. 
212; Meyer v. Wheeler, 65.Ja. 390- The leading English case is Mersey Stul 
0- Iron Co. v. Naylor, 9 Q. B;Div. 648. empha~zing the ''evincing of an inten. 
·tion no longer to be bound by the coniract." Whatever may be 'the JMrits 
of these conflicting views, ~e result reached in 1he instant case seems entirely 
satisfactory. The contract clearly contemplated the prompt payment of each 
invoice a5 it fell due. and the buyer's arbitrary refusat to pay his back iilstaIJ-
ment until the ncXt dcliVCJ:y had bten made would seem to be a sufficient 
justification for the ·plaintifr& withdrav;al from the contraCt. 
. . 
CoNTRACTS-lD£N.TlTY OF CoNTRAcnNG Piln- A MATERIAL EtlKENT.-
Plaintiff, desirous of ·attending the opening performance of a play, a}lplied 
twice for a ticket. Because of some past trouble between him and the theatre 
management the applications were refused. Plaintiff thereupon securtd a 
ticket through the agency of one Poll~ to whom the management was will-
ing to sell. When plaintiff presented himself at the theatre on the evening 
of the performance the attendants, acting upon the direction of the defendant. 
the managing director of the company operating the· theatre, refused him 
admission, offering to refund the purchase price. In action for damages for 
wrongfu11y and maliciously indqcing the company to brealc its contract, held 
(1) plaintiff had no contract, and (2) semble, even if he did, defendant. a 
~t 9f the company, having acted bona fide within the scope of his 
~uthomy, could not be held liable. Said v. BMtt, [1920] 3 K. B. '497· 
As to rights of ticket holders expelled from theatre seats, see Hurst v. 
PictMrt Theatres, Lid. (1915], 1 K. B. 1. In the principal case it seems to be 
as.sumed that the Hurst case applies to ticket holders refused admission as 
well as to those ejected. See discussion of the Hurst. case in 13 · MtcH. L. 
· J«v. ;t01. The effect as to the formation of a. contract c.r completion of a 
sale of a mistake as to the identity of the other party to the transactioa is 
RECENT IMPORT ANT DECISIONS 
<J1~~scd in 18 Mica. L. REv. 709- See C11nda;, v.- Lindsay, 3 App. Cas. <159; 
Phillips· v. Brooks [1919], 2 ·K B. 243; Edmunds v. Transporlation Co., 135 
Mass. 283; Rod/if! v: Da1li11gtr, 141 Mass. 1; 35 LAw QuAll't. ~REv. 288. In. 
~riving at its conclusion that- ther~ was no contract the court applies the 
principle laid dc;iwn by Potliicr in TR!llTt J•ES OBLlGATIONS. s. 19. "Whenever 
the consider.ation of the._person ·with whom I am wiliing to contract enters 
as ,an· ~lement irno the contract which I am willing to make, error with regard 
to the person destroys my consent and consc<iuently destroys "the contr.lct," 
-etc. Essentially· the same principle is -laid down· .in FRY ON SP.ECIFIC Pt:a-
FOR-M~NCF., ·sec. 229. and ha_s been i:~ogni:i;ed and applied in many English 
cases. McCardie, J., howevtr, confessed "that the question is one of diffi-
culty," and therefore gave co11sideration t~ the other point involving the 
Jimits of the· rule of Lumli!}' v. c,.,, 2 E. & B. 216, when sought to- be applied 
to a case wherein. the defendant. was the agent of the party b_reaking the ('OD· 
tract. T1ie conclusiOn· on thi!> point would seem to ·be equally sound with 
that on the first. · 
· CosTS-ALLOWANC.E oF Cos'l'S Felt BRm ExC.ESSIVt 1N Stzt.-On affinn. 
ance of a judgment where the resP<>ndent filed a brief of- forty-six printed 
pages, ·quoti_ng extensively from the testimony folll)d in the abstract, litld, 
that respondent be allowed costs ·for brief not· in excess of twenty pages, a'.i 
this· was, in the judgMent or' the court, sufficient in which to make a state-
"ment of facts and to· discuss the legal qnestions involved. Fossali v. Gartltlla 
(Utah, 1920), 193 Pac. 6.p. . 
The courts have consistently held to the theory that .c~ts are given as a 
reimbursement for necessary e."<penscs and not as an instrumentality to make. 
it perilous for'a party to come into conn. ~d for this reason the cpurts seek 
to keep the ·costs as small as posSJ°ble. Where the transcript of a record is 
unnecessarily long the l~sing party should not be required to hear. the Durden. 
Sltphe11son_ v. Chappell, 12 Te.'t. Civ. App. 296. The losing· p'rty is not to 
be assessed with the costs of a tirief th."\t is unnecessarily prolix. · Cobb. v. 
Harltnstein, 47 Utah 174- In Wilso11 v. Pontiac-Railioay Co., s7 Mich. 155. 
the "bill of exceptions was too voluminciis and the costs. of the losing party 
were reduced. Just what makes a r~ord ·or brief tQO prolix is largdy a 
questio
0
n to he determined upon the circumstances surrounding th·e particular 
case. The Michigan court rules provide that the rcaird on appeal shall be 
reduced to narrative form rather- than be reported by question and answer. 
and where the record is -iiot made in narrative. form, when .such form is siiit-
able, the costllwill be r~duced. R11ttle v: Foss, 161 Mich. JJ2. The~Wisconsin 
court rules p~~tle ·for·an abstract of necessary par.ts ~f .a rccor~ on appeal: 
and where unnecessary parts are included in the al>stract the costs wilt be 
reduced. Willt:y v. LtWis, 113 Wis. 61& Testimony of witnesses on which 
n~ question was raised below is unnec~ ma~er. ·Gto.· W. Roby L11mbtr 
Co. v. Gras, 73 Mich. 363. Printing a motion for a new ttial when such 
motion is not reviewahle is unnecessary matter for which no costs will be 
allowed. Ntdtrland Ins. Co. v. Hall, P6 Fett 741. Where the brief contained 
large reprints of the abstract, the costs were reduced. Slttlt v. Crabtree. 
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130 Iowa 313- If _the -~ppellant"1 abstract or record on appeal might b7 
proper condensation be shortened, the court may· reauce the costs. H tu1gldoa 
v. BiliOJJ, 84 Kan. 88.o.. 'there are two w.ays in ·which the. c:ourts r~ 
costs: they eitli~ refuse· any costs Oil the defective r_ecord. or make ·an arbi· 
trary r.edudion for ~ecessary · matte,r. The cases uniformly hold that 
wher:e the :whole reeord· or brief is fmntee5$UY, or where it is so defective 
that it must be stricken from the files, or where" an additfonal bnef or record 
is required ~se of the. p;miting PartJ's own negligence, no costs what· 
ever ar~ allowed therefor. J,. re- WetmOl'e, 6 Wash. 271; ·Hanhllit.s. v. Bar•. 
rett, 143 Wis. 639; Ht1n(lty v •. Clsicago R. Co., 142 Iowa 697; Treat v. Hiles, 
'6 W"11. 3&1; Mann· v. H~fler, 1~ N. Y •. Supp. 663; Finlns v. ··Hei11ze, al 
Mont. 548; Dt1/Mr. v. Pat1l.rOJJ, 1rt> WiS. 281 ;.Bo1SOl11 v. Peabody Coal Co., 
143 m App. 163. The. courts also uniformly bold that where a necessaJT 
brief ~- rec:Ord contains unnecessary matter and the cout aUows it to remain 
on. the files;. deduction will be· made only to cover the costs 011 that part which· 
is ura11ecessary. Cobb v. Harttll.Slein, S?tpra; Wilsors.v. Pontra~- Ra_ilwo1 Co., 
npa; Lnltr y. Thielke, 115 Wis. 389; Spaf19 v. Robi111ori, 24 W. Va. 3'ZI· 
See 5 STANl>. CYc. OF PaOc.· 1004- . . 
DEAm--civn. AcnoN-I~ATZOK OI' .. Cau.•-A statute gave a 
· right of action in &se of death by wr0!1kful a.Ct to the child .or children of 
the decwed; PJaintift'1 father .and m~er were ~ect· in accordance 
with th~ tn"bal ceremonies ~ ~ Tunica Indians, .of w~ tn"be. they were 
members, bUt the law of Louisiana does not recognize such marriage. -PlaiQ-
tift's mother ha~ been killed, tbtough the alleged negligence of the defend-
ant, he brought.action under the statute. Held, no "cause of action, .far the 
word . ..,child" in the~ statute means legitimate child. YQjl&hican. v. Tezas t· 
P. Ry. Co. (ta., 1920), 86 South. 5.,Q. . . 
Authority for the above view h found in LTM'lt v. KflOo~,, 118 La. 6u; 
McDOrsaltl "- SOtl,hent-Ry. Co., 71 S. C. ·352; Good v.· ToWM, s6 Vt. 410; 
Harkirss v. Plliladeljihia b ·Reatli"!I Jly. Co~ 15 Phil 286·; Dkkifl.fon v. R1. 
Co., 2 H. & L (Exch.) 735- In.most of these cases the pc)sition of parent 
and child is reversed, but the same interpretation pnvails and the mother ii 
denied recovery for the death. of her iltegitimate child. In GalwniJ1t, H. & 
S. A. RJ. Co. :v. ·Wailttr, 48 Tex. Civ. App. ~ twa jUegitimate children 
recovered fo.r the death· Qf thm mother, but the court seems to rely some-
what on a ·mtute abolishing the rule that 'statute5 ·in derogation of the 
common Ja"P' m:e to be-strictly constnted.. Jn Milhl's ~dm'r:s v. 'Mich. SOtltll. 
K~ C9., lc:J Ohio S~ 272, the court clearly indicat~ that illegitimacy should 
not.bar p'taintifi'1 recovery, ~t such c0nstrw:t"10J1 was n.ot absolufel)C neces-
sary .to.the disposal of the case. There. is c~idcrable solid· authofity, how• 
~; ·for the doctrine that under ~c;b statute .the mother can .recover· for. 
the death of her illegitimate clu1d. StcMril1 7"itTe" & TnlSI Co v. Wr.rf 
Cliicago St. RJ. Co., 91 Ill- App. 332; Afarskall v. Wtibaslt Ry •. Co., 120 Y~ 
!7.S. . ~ statement of the cour.t to the coritra17 when this 1asf cue ~ 
before the Federal court, 46 lea. .. is pure did•*- In Ktnitty v. St'"'°"". 
RECENT JM PORT A.NT DSCISION$ 
Air Linc R;y. Co .• 161 N. C. 14. affirmed" i}'i 2<4P U. ·s. 489, plaintiffs recovered 
a.s neXt of kin for the d~tli of their half-brolber, an illegitimate son· of their· 
moth"cr. In ne:µ-ly all Ameriean jurisdictions, including all states from 
y.'hi~ cjtations are given- above,·except South Barolina, a lmtard ·can inherit 
from his mother; and vice wr,ra. 'fhe sole justification of the instant case 
would ·seem to be in p_reced.ent. .It is· out of· harmony with the present teD!i-
cncy in "the legal attitude toward bastards, in which tendency common law 
jurisdictions are niore tardt than other civilized countries. ·See 16 Cor.. I.. 
REv. 6g8. The old coinmon law policy of preventing illicit interc0urse bi 
making neither party," and neitlier party's 11roperty, responsible for the sup-
port and ~ducation of the iilnoceiit product .there0f, hardly commends itself 
to reason "or sense of justice. ·The line·of auth<>rities last note<l· above shows 
one more step toward the time when the. Jaw will cease to· penalize tht child 
for the wrong of'its parents, and this -~t.q> is taken by decision, uat special 
legislation.. For· the most progressive American legislation in this field see 
I.Aws· 01' N02'1'1i" DAKOTA, ."1917, page So.. · · · 
DmS=ATTtKPT£D Dwvnv IN Escaow TO THE Guwm...;.pursuant t6 
a· cont~ t.o .marri bes: so. s~ri as he lawfully l:Pight P hands ti> C, a recent 
diV-Orcee, a deed tO certain land-said deed ~c ab$0lute on its t&ce-witb 
the oral" stipulatii>n that the- deed shoµld not be rte0rdtd . ar be Gpl!l"athoe 
unle5s P shouid ;fail to marri C. A. third ~ has the deed recorded con-
trary ·io.ilie expre5s wish !>f c.. P marries c. c dies, leaving as her heUs;. 
at-law P and B, daughfer by Jter.firSt husband.. B dies, lea.ving as lier hein-
at-law· D~, her-husband, and .1)2, her fatllet (C"s. first husband). P briiigs bill 
in ~uit)' against ])1 and n:a ~o.temovc dauci. from title to land ·descn"bed in 
·tite deed. Held, since neither P nor C intended the deed as a preSeritly.opera· 
tive- conveyan~e, there was neithtr deli:very nor ac:ceP~ and title did aat 
pass. Mitchell v.· Clem (DI., 1920)) 128 N. E. 81s. 
!11 a ~s~ very similar as to. .delivery the stipulation was that the deed 
should-nqt be operative until .tlie- purchase· price sh0utd be paid; n~ paymeats 
-were made; the· iranfor: ·r:etook. possession and the unrecorded deed was 
destr0yed.. A judgmmt creditor··of the grantee. sought to attach the land. 
The eourt held. that by the· handing over ~ the grantee of the ·deed absolute 
on its face ti~~ passed· regar:dless of the oral cooditiQC?. Creditor'.s right was, 
of course; subject to th~ grantor:s prior lien for the purchase priee. BoU 
·v. ~ncJl!rsor. (K~tuckY. Court of Appeals, 1920), 225 S.. E. 36L BOtla courts 
antrounce .th~ rutc" that a delivery cannOt ~ made .to the grantee in escrow. 
The l11inois. court -has helil. v~ry consistently that 1t1ch a dtliveri iS absolute. 
Blak~ v." Ogden, 223 ·Ill 204. and. cases cited therein. But confronted with 
a bard case. the- cou~ (inds itS Way oUt by sayipg Jhat there was .no deliVU7 
at, all. This seems" to be giving_ effect ~ the oral condjtiOn, for one can 
hardly ·doubt that the ~urt -w0uld b:lve :found. sufficlent dtlivery if 1he 
grani9r· ~!l. died without" inarryllig the grant,ee. · It is suggested that the 
coUrt might frankly. •it thit it .. will. pc effect to oral conditions when 
they can ~ clear~y proved, as did the Supr~ Court· .of Virginia ReeDtl,-. 
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.VJiitalur v. Lau, 104 S. E. :?52, 19 !hes. L. Rn-. 343. For full ·nolle on 
the subject by Professor B"allantine, ·see 3 hr.. !.:Aw Buu.. 3. 29 YALE LAw 
}OtwiAJ. 826. . 
DIVO~l't:Cll'IC PomoN oF Hu.sBAND's EsTATt CANNOT ORDINAIULV 
»: Aw..u»n>"As.AI.~xoNY.-:in a divorce proce_eding the wife had been granted. 
$30 per month alimony; on appeal, i:he aSked that this porticn of the decree 
be reversed and that she be al~owed to remain in the hoine c • the husband, 
·which ~nsisted of a house and twenty-four acres of land and was his sole 
real esµte. Held, a wife is not entitled to have any specific parcel of real 
estate assigned as her own. Alimony is usually an 1ll1owance of money oUt 
of the husband's e5tate. but not the· estate i~clf. ~grwe v. -1.owgrwe 
(Va., .192')), 104 S. E. 8ac. . . 
Permanent alimony after the dissolution of the marriage statuS is wholly 
a creation of the written law. It was not. known to the comnion or eccle-
siastical law. Bacon v. Bacon, 43 Wis. 197; .Brenger v. Brenger. 142 Wis. 26, 
26 L R. A. (N. S.) J87. However, .in coostruing the statutes the courts 
have from the first been influenced by t)le ~glish practice, under which the 
courts gave the wife an allowance only, and sitch a thing as partition -of 
estate was unknown. Bacon v. Bacon, supra. In many states such an allow-
ance is expressly pro:vided' for by statute. 19 C. J. 26o.. Such a statute in 
Ohio. providing that "the court shaTI allow such alimony out of the. hus-
band's property as it deems reasonable. etc.," raised a doubt as to whet.her· 
this ~£fort. to enlarge the power of the court. had not in fact resulted in cut-
ting its authority down so that .it could give bnly specific property as ali-
many. A discussion· of Lape v. Lape, 124 N. E. St, whicli involves this par-
ticular statute, is found in 18 MICH. L RJ.:v. 6o. Stc.alSo 18 MICJJ. L Rn-•. 
m, for a di$cussion of a Kansas case, Nixon v. Nixon, 188 Pac. 2Z';, wbic:A 
involves a similar statute. In the absence. of such ·statutes, ihe holding of 
the principal case is without doubt the majority. rule; aJthC1Ugh there is a 
conflict of authority. This rule is based on the proposition that the claim 
of the wife for alimony is a personal claim on the husband. Almond v . 
.Al•ond, 4 Rand. (2S Va.) (i68, IS ~ Dec. ;81. Therefore!, it comes under 
the general principle that chancery courts have no inherent power to declare 
liens against real esU.te to secure debts which mav be estabiished against tht 
person. Perkins v. Perkin.r, 16 Mich. 162. There are cases which. although 
they recognize as. law the rule of the principal case, do set aside specific 
property for the wife out of regard for the special equities of a partkubai 
case. Instances of this arise where the property has been purcllased with 
the wife's money or has been acquired largely or wholly as 'JI& result of &er 
earnings, industry, or frugality. Mussing v. Mu$sing, IOI. 111. 126. This, 
however is a different case from one in which provisio11 tor her support is 
made soiety on the groun~ dUi.t a man is in duty bot¢ri to support his wife 
-that is, where the property is granted to. her as a-' result of her stahis as 
wife. Cluunpiolf·v. Jlsers, ~ Ill. 3o8. 310. 
RECENT IMPORT ANT DECISIONS 
EvmtNtt-Poss~sioN · oit STOI.tN Paoiu1~-Puscnano~.-In a pr:Ote-
cution f.or r~eiving stolen property, an· instructic.111 that "the finding of stolCn 
property in the possession of· another shortly. after said· property bad been 
stolen raises the presu~pti011 of guilt as against the person in" whose posscs-
sion the same it· found * * *" was htld not erro.ieous when considered with 
other instrUctions. State v. Rau (N. D., lg2>), 179 N. W. 993-
". in .a prosecution for grand larceny, an ins~ioo "that ·the pc)ssession 
of property recently stolen and unexplained ~ the defendant dords pt"e-
sumptive evidence. of his guilt" was lttl!f erroliecias, such. Janguagc beins an· 
instruction on the we~t of evidence. . ~..:arrow ... Slldt (Ark., ·1~). 235 
s. w. 311,. . . . . .. 
The great majority of lhe courts deny that any~ presumption attacba 
to the unexptaip~ possession of p~ in. c:aseS similar to those · abcm; 
agreeing that th~. weight of such evidence is to ·11e determined eolely by the 
jury •. Of these, probably the greater number bold such ¢explained. posses· 
sion in itself Wal"rants a coitvicti0n. by th.e jury. Kt4r/gea:n1 v. Stott, g; 
Neb. 713; Blockb11"' v. Stolt, ;8 Tex. Cr. R. '177; Mask, v. Statt, u Ga. 
.Apji~ jo3; Statt.v. Ptrry; i65 Iowa 215. Others bold that the mere fact ol 
unexplainCd posscs$iott a10ne will not. warrant a conviction. Ptolk v. Ro4-
mqwt::, 16 Cat App. .358.; Stott. v. Trospe;., 41 Mont. 442- A few support 
the doctrine that. a t~ · prcsuinptiora of pilt attaches. State v. T11mw. 65 
N .. c. 592: Stm v. Good, 132 Mq. 114- · TbO~ these mks ere quite differ· 
en!.. the instfuctions of, the "courts suppornq tJie ·doctrine that no pt'CSU1Dp-
tion of law attacJies show a m~lcading and .anfortunate <;0nfusion of ~ 
These" courts. as in the principal cases, 
0
frequmtJy speak of a "'i>res.imp&n 
of guilt,". "presumptive evidence· ·of guilt." "prima fade evidence of pi!t,• 
etc., f;u1ing to Point out clearly the difference' betwem".a preswnptioo of 
law and a so-called ''pr~umption" or inference of fact. The former requireS 
a jOJY, in th~ absence of evidence to the contrai}-, tci find according to the 
presumi>tiol'l; 'the tatter alfowa the jury to draw its own condusion ~
the· ultunate fact.· The first involves a compulsory conc1usicm. made by.Jaw; 
the second, a ."penimsibJe cteducticin"· by· the jury." .JJliiructi6as similar to 
thoSe. mmtion~ -are likely t.o ·cause the jmy to find in accordance with the 
"presumptien" _laid down by the court. ·thOugb· the tatter intends to allow 
~em merely an- inference of .. fact. Unless ~ carefully qualified and 
explained SQ that· the" ordinary jury Can undcntand, sucJi• instructions .caD 
most safely 1>e held erroneous. · See --W1c11oat oN .EvmPci, Sec. 2513. and 
12 L. R. A:. (N. S.) ~-
.EXTRAT£UrtoJtIAtm"-E.\51':Jl~NTS 01' l.tGH'l' ~ An tJf eitmt:sz· I.AW.~· 
Accordibg to a. recent dea!iO?· of ~e B~iti~h Consular C9urt.·there. is no 
~sement of.Jight' and air by imptied";rant in the Jaw:'~f .. CJiina. .A B~ 
subject owned a house ancf lot: in· Shanghai in i868. He ·soJd the house and 
part ~f the Jot to ~other· British· Stlbject and· the adjoining ilnoccupied part 
of the lot to l German s~bjeCt. "Ji:t I.!)29 the owner o(- the hOUIC'" ~ppJied t0 
~e Consular Court for an injunctjon tG ·r~· the pm of the adjohlJaa 
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unoctupied part from interfering with an easement o'f light and air. Under 
similar .circumstances the English law wou1d recognize an easement of light 
and air arising by implied grant. Palnur v. Flt'Uher. I Lev. 122; Alie# v. 
Ta;lor,. 16 Ch. D. JSS. But tbis suit involved an intere!>t in land, and so 
had to be decided according to th~ le; loci rei sitM, i.e., the law of China. 
Charle.ru:ort/I, Pilling er Co. -v. Secretary of .$late_ for ·Foreign Affairs (191>1), 
·"- C. 373- No mention could be foiliid of apy such easemtnt in any kno\vn 
Chinese law. The c0u~ wu inclined to· regard the theory of implien grant 
as somethini which Ji.ad developed m Englii;Jl law to meet- local need•, and 
it doubted whether any such theory «:.xisted in Chinese ·law in 1&>8. ·Eveu 
in Etiglisb law the implied grant is a piesumption-whicb. may be rebutted tiy 
showing extr.i.ordinary circumstanceS; The court thOugbt that uiversity of 
nationality among do~t. an~ . servimt ownm ~igbt be regatded as an 
extraorclinat;J circumstance in an extraterritariai c_Olµltrj. The· injunction 
was denied. leave 'being grantCd to appeal to "the Pri\.y COunciL T""' Wa 
et 141. v • • -4tki1UOIJ' er Dallas (Nov., 1!)20); H. B .. M. Supreme Court for China 
~CORL - ... 
INrox1CA-r111:G Li12uollS-WaAT ·1s .,. Btvi:v.ct::-{luE1;'i1oif oF FAcr.~The 
defendant was indicted for· setting Jatitaica giiig« containiiig· ss ·per cent 
atcOboJ. under. a statute providing tliat "any beverage which contaiPs more 
than <lllC per. cent of alcohol.* * *·shall· bC deemcif to be intoxicating liquor 
within the meaning of thi~ chapter." Held, thct mere· presence. of a hip .per-
centage of .aleohol did not ·tJJake the preparation an intoxicating l~fJOr. under 
the statute, .without a further. puding bj the.jury that it could De"· anci orc)j. 
mrlJy. waS used. as .a beverage. -Ctnnmonwealt'N v. $oekey (!.fa~ .1920),: 
~ N. E. ,SS. . 
· W~ether. :a· "Jiqwd con~ipg ·an al~ohol~t: content capable of producing 
intoxication, but which is not o."StCDS101y sold as~ beverage, is within a.pro-
lu'Ditor;y statute dependS .large.Jy; of cotU-se, UJ>Oll the ter:mS of the ·particutar 
statute. Thul; where. a statute- makes it unlawful to !ell '.'any intoxicating 
d~ mixture, compound, or bJtters wliatever, in any quantity or. for 
anY use 9r ptirpc>R," medicines; _toilet prepllatioos, etC., are, included, atthOugh 
sold in gQC>d:faith and not '9r~~rily used as bevera8es. Co_mt>loH v: $tale, 
95 AIL 25- But in prosecutions for violations of other st:itUtes ·eXJ>ressty 
includint ~~ liquids, w~e the· prohibition "iS simply against the $ale of 
the same as bev~·the question of.mteni"is controlling~ Wa1ker v. Daily, 
101 m App; 575; Stati v. Hasting1, 2 Boyce (DeL) .482; Bf,.tra11d v. Slote, 
73 Miss. 51. SeC alS<.'·Schemmer v. Stott {Neb., 1920),. 18o N. W. 581. Under 
statutes lik~ that involved ~·th~ principal case, CDJi>loYing merely ~eral 
d~iptive teipis suclJ as'"'alcObolic liquor," ;intoXicating '!iquor," or ":into.xi. 
eating. beverage," ii) addition ·to the questiQn of tlic actiW alcOholic content 
of the liquid; the additional que5tion arises as· to whether "it. is a beverage 
Qr-liquor wi~ .the m,caning of the stattite.. One court bas said .that a fiuid 
iS within ·'the statute ooty -when it is a" liquor intcrided for u!(e as a beverage, 
and capabie -of be~ ~ used. which comain~ al~ohol in such a proportion 
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that it will produce intoxication when taken in. such quantities as may P.l'K-. 
ti~lly be drunk. Sarulolo.rki v. State, 6s TU. Cr. R. 33- Gentran,-, how-
ever, it is immaterial whether. the decoction was intended for ute as a bew-
erage, provide~ it is capable of use as suth, ~d is sold in evasion of the'· 
prohibitory legislation.· · Stat~ v; K eitr. 14. Vt. 50. Bqt .the presumption· ii 
that medicinal, toilet and C\llinary preparations, recognired as such by stand-
ard authority (such as the United States Dispensary), and not rea.onabb-
capable of use ·as intoxicating bevenges, are not ordinarily ·to be reprdc4 
as within ~ meaning of t'he statute. · J.f aso• v. Stale, 1 Ga. App. 53-i. Still, 
the presumption may be rebutted and sucb products .be found &o fJe within 
the statute.· Stale v. Intosicating Liq11or.r and Yepeli, 118 Me. 198- Except · 
in clear cases where the 11rincipfe ot judicial notice may.be invoked. Mtt'lfly 
v. State; 9 Ga. App. 835, the question ,whether a giyen liquid is or is not a 
beverage is for the julJ.'. Stale v. Miller, '92 Kan. ~ L. R. A. 15117 F, 2A 
and cases ~ere collected. · 
.JuDGH!NtS-.ABs~Nl'E OF Cotmsrt AS UNA\·omABu CAsuAI.TY Excus1KC 
·DEFAULT.-Counsel was erigaged· and put in possession of all the. facts .afli. 
records necessary for the defense of an eXpcCted-~ Because of illaeu 
in his (anµly, such counsel was excused from attendance at the regular. term 
of chancecy court and informed there wollld be RO SPeciaJ term by- the chan-
cellor. The expccied sitit was comnicnced in his absence.-"'.l'lie party, rcJ,ir.c 
upon his counsel, did.n~ing mor~ than leave·a·copy of the summons sened 
up~i_n him at the office of his counsel. In the absence of aDf appearance jq-
ment by default was taken. An action Wal brought to !d aside the juq• 
ment on th~ gl'ounds of "unavoida!>le casualty or misfortune preventing the 
party from prosecuting or def~ding," as provided i17·statUtc. Heltl {JlcCul-
lough,. J., disscnti~g): It w~ through the· acts of the court that the party 
did not defend. and this was unavoidable casualty. Judgment ncatcd. Ber-
rirsgw v. Stnmu (Ark., 1920). ·225 S. W. Lf. . 
. Under· a like. statute, the. a'bscnce .of counsel because of ·his own ~~ 
geiicc was lstlcl not to be "tinavoidabJe casualty" as would. justify scttins 
~ide of a ju~ent taken by def~ult. Wagner v, I.utas (Okla., 1920). 1m 
Pac.~· . 
.. Statutes providing for· vaca~g of judgments bv default occause of 
unavoidable casualty or misfortune or excusable neglect are common. Pme 
neg~gencc or lade of diligence is not unavoidable casualty wilhin tJic·mean-
ing of the .U.tute. Starks v. Ob"" fr Sou_ c,,., 13tt ea.· ~1l'; Gooclnl .y. · 
LtwU, 101 Kan. 48i · Va-Caticn of the judgment luis been refused where: 
answer not made becau,e of forgetfulness, lo1'es v. Bibb Brick Co.; 120 CL 
.321; attorney was not obtainCd beCause of· Jack- of diligence; Fort# v. At1el-
·ge1, SS Oltla. 515; train missed.And apj)Cal ~orgotten, N,; v. Soeior, 93 W'at; 
·40· Unavoidable casualty is rather soµie event which.human foresight.; PfP" 
dence or sagacity could not prevent:~· Courts have held as grounds for neat-
~ judgments such aots as:. siclcness, Liggtll v. W omll, gS Ia.· 529;° miscar-
riaze of the-mails, Clsi~~go, R. I. /:t Pac. Co. v. ButlunrJ, 26 Okla. 6os; ~ 
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road accident delaying attorney. Omro v. Ward, IO Wis. a33; accidental shoot-
ing preventing 'appearance,· Harpis· v. Begley, 129 Ky4 477; party insane. 
Sou;llern Nat. I.ife J11s. Co. v. FC1rd's Admr., 151 Ky. 476; pl'.rty imprisooecf. 
BoneU v. R. W. & 0. R. R. Ca., 12 Hun. 218. There.is a relation of prin-
cipal ·and agent bet~cen client .and counsel. So -the •"ncgl~t of the ~omq 
in permitting judgment to be taken against his client is the. neglect of tl:.e 
I . 
client and cannot be urged a5 groun~s· for vacating the judgment. Aloou •· 
Horner, 14(). I.nd: .287 :· ·lfam v. Perst111, 173 N. C~ i.2. EYen when· the. client 
is free from an. fa~lt; Pl1illips 1:- Co. Y. Collin-I 8; Ga. 66; So, 193, wbm 
the· neglect of the· attorney is e.'ltcusable, this is' a." much available as grounds 
to set aside ihe j1~dgment as though it Jrad bttn the excusable cond~ of the 
party. lifelde v. Rt~..,,olds. 1~ qat. 308; Collier v. Fit~pa1rici1 :u l!out. sss. 
A few courts bold the n~lect. of counsel may be considered surprise or 
unavoidable ca9Ulllty on the 'part of the client, and varate. the judgment. 
StvatllntJ.' v. Sm:age1 101 N. C. 10.1- It seems that the.~ty ~ust ,;sSl:IDC the 
risk o.f selecting a careful and diligent attorney. . Each party is entitlet! ~ 
his day in .court, l!ut both ·mnst take advantage of his opi>ortunities· and be 
diligent .in prosecuting or defending. If one party is negligent the Othcz 
party should .not be. put to fnrther inc0nvenience and jbe risk of lasing his 
judgment by the· setting aside of that judgment and a new trial· B~ if~ 
party suffers unavoidaJM casualty or misfortune, such is a proper basis for 
.setting aside:the judgment. The negligence of counsel should not be c:oa-
sidered unavoidable·casualty. Just what facts show t1ueb misfortune is a 
question over which the ~ are ln confusion. The decision must of DC\.~ 
sity be left largely tQ the ·discretion of the trial court. · Upon:these principle!' 
the pri1.1c;iiia,l cases appear to. be correctly decided. In the 01.dahoma ·case 
mere neglect ·of counsel was not considered unavoi~ble ca."llaJtY.. On the 
other hand, in the Arkallsas case there was no negligence 0n tlie part of 
co1,1nsel or party," but rather an event wh_icb_ h11man foresight could not ~ 
vent, the mistake of. the co.urt. See al59 Hoclg~i v. 41,sander1 44 OJcJa..sgS; 
Ariacon_tla Mining Co. v. Saile1 16 Mont. 8. · 
MASm .AND SnvAN'l'-l!:»PLOvn Com.\cnNc WITHOUT ExPttrA.nns 
oir PRoFJ't · Mtiw.Y 'JO:PRovme Doc1'oRS FO!l '.EKPI.oYEtS Noa LrAllLt "* l.A1"-
m's NECI.iCENcE IN. ~mNG TREM.-A coal·com.Pany employed :a·pbJsi-
cian to give medical treatment to 'its eniployces. deducting a small $Um.~ 
month from their wages, out of which· his salary. was paid. The ·c-ompa.JJ.y 
itself deriVed no profit from the fund. In an action by the administrator of 
an employee for· damages oiJ account of the negligence <>f the physician. so 
eD_Jployed which resutte_d in the death of the plai~titrs intestate, held; th:at 
the ccimpatty was not liable in the absence of a showing of iack of ordinary 
. care in th.e· sctectiOn of the pbysi~. 0!' a· retention .witts kriowtedge of 
·incompetency. Virginia Jr<1n1 Coai & Co~e Cortrpanj. v • . Odie's Admr. (Va., ·l~); ·JO,S S. E. 107. . . . . . . 
·Jn the absence either.of an.expre5s contract on the part of the emplo,er 
to !umish skilled medical µ=eatmen~ or a profit ·accruing to the latter from 
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wage deductions, most cases support the result reached in the prindpal ca.~ 
though not all are consistent as· to the underlying theory. Whether the" 
employer contributes all, part, or nnthing to the support of the physkian, 
the result is the same, providing be receives no profit· fiom the arrangement, 
and .he is liable only for failure to use reasonabl.: care fo employing a com-
petent physician or for the retention ol one knoWn to be incompetent. Pitls'-
burg, nc., R. C<>. v. Sullivan, 141 Ind. 83; Q11i,i1S v. Railroad Co., 94 Tenn.· 
713; Railroad Co. v. Arlin, 6o Fed. 365; Eiglim:y v. U. P.R. Co., 93 IL ,538; 
Haggtrl:y v. -St. LouiS R. Co., 100 Mo. App. 421; Gt1, v. Ltmal"k Futl Co., '2 
W. Va. ;aS; Richarclso1S v. Carbon Hill Coal Co., IO Wash. 648; Wells·v. 
FteyBakt;.· Co., s; Wash. "6.s8; Ark,., nt., R. Co, v. Pearso11, 98 Afk. 399; 
Big Ston~ Gap Co. v. Kttron;102 Va. 23; P.oling v. San Anto1"o R. Co., 32 
Tex. Civ: App .. 48;; Nic!Jalson v. Atchif.on, etc., Hospi!pl Asrri; '}]Kan. 48o; 
Nations v. Luclclington., etc., R. Co., j33 i.a. 6,s;. Contra, Phillips v. St. Lot1is 
R. Co., 2n Mo. 419- . One line of cases cited takes the ground 'that where no 
profit is rccciv¢ the principle exempting charitable h~spitals from liability 
for negligence of physicians applies. Railroad Co. v. Arlin, ~pro;. WtUs·v. 
Ftrry-Baktr Cq., supra. Sfe 18 MICH. L. IU:v. sS9. aS t~ liability of char-
itable hospitals, and 4 L R. A. (N. S.} ~. as to- rclatio.n of that to the prtS-
ent problem. · The analogy to charitable hospitals is disapproved in Haggen, 
v. St. Louis R. Co., silpra, and Ark., etc., R.. ·co. v. Pearson, supra, inasmUt'h 
as the purpose of the employer cannot be said to be purely philanthropical. 
The bc'tter ground- seems to ·be that of the principal "case, which holds the 
physician "to be neitlier a servant nor an ·agent but an independent contractor. 
On that the0ry the employer is liable only when there is a contractUat rela-
tion between .the cmi)loyer and employee, making it the duty of the. former 
to furnish· skilled medical treatment. whiCb" a,nnot' be e\raded through the 
interoositi~ of an independent contractor. An cxi>rc5s contract to this effect 
is obviously sufficient.. Wells v." Ferry.Baktr Co., supra; Sawdey v. Spo-
ka..e, ,1;.; R. Co., 30 Wash.~ ~uch a contract will·bc implied. where ~e­
cmployer deriv~ an actual profit f~om the wage.deduction. .Tesas Coal Co. 
v. Connaughton; ro 'Tex. Civ. App. 642; Sawdey v. SpokaPll!, e!c., R. Co., 
supra. As the test by which the status of a hospital as charitable or other-
wise is ascertained is whether or not a profit is received. and since a non.; 
charitable hospital is. liable for the negligence of its physicians, it -is -clear 
that the same result •is obtained whether or not the analogy of the charitable 
. hospital is .applied in cases. ~f -the present: type. - · • 
MUNICIPAJ. CoRPORATIO.Ns-Ct'l'Y OwtD HO DU'l'Y'. OF Ac:ri-."'£. INSMCTION OF 
Aurouonn.i IN FAVOll oF· AssESSOll Sot.rcxnNG IbDt.-Tlie city of. Yonkers 
placed one of its autom0biles in the.charge and control of the city engineer. 
The city assessor, wishing to go -to a dis~t part of the city for the .purpo5e· 
~f transacting certain business in the line of bis official duties, a~ked the 
· engineer- to take him ther~. · Due to a defect ~ its steering appara_tus, tlie 
car·was overturned and the assessc>r"Was 1a1Jed. His .administratrix brought 
this action f~r damages on the theory-~ the city should have. inspected the 
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car. Htld, that the assessor wasa mere licensee and the city owed him DO 
dut~, and that even if the relationshiP had l>tt,n ~ch as ordinaril1 to· es~h­
. lish such: a duty the city would not be liable here because it was acting in a 
governmental capacity. Carroll v. qty '!f .Ycmktrz °(N. Y., 1920). 184 N. Y. 
s .. 647. . 
The general propositipn that -i. municipal corporation ·.is not liable for. 
toits Committed whil~ it is actfug· in a: governmental capacity. and that it is 
iiable for those committed while it iS acting in its private . 'or. corporate 
capacity, is so well settled that llO citation of authority. is necessary. For 
an interesting discussion of this gene~ subject, see IO Mtcu. L ~- ~- In 
the instant case it was clear frcmi the evidence that the deceased was a mere 
licensee. It ·further appeared trurt ~· enp;eei:. was not acting within the 
scope of his authority. Consequent~y, . the ~ Could not be. held liable in 
any·tase on those facts.· MuitU v. Bostox Eltvatttl Railway, 191 Mass • .w1; 
Tha:yu v. Cil:y of Bo.rton, 19 ·Pii:k. ·516. N:evertbeless, the court discussed 
ih~ above )ropc)sition~. and indicated that the i>t"OP.U way to ascertain in any 
case into which class of powers a certain act shoUtd be placed was to deter-
mine whether the city at' the·time' of the casUalt7 was car.rying on ,·public 
function or whether ·it. was acting" for. its own private advancement and 
emolument. The ~nfiict,, pi the -authQrities ~ due :to the unceoainty of the 
proper test to be applied rather than to the uncertainty of the Jaw itself. 
Several rules have ·beeO advanced by thC courtL Some have applied the 
test of whether the muDicipaJitY derives revenue from the service or. not. 
Others say ~t whether-~&; work u of a commercial or of a public .character 
should -determine. · Bailey v. TM. lfa;yor, 3 H;ill 531. - Still others' draw a 
different distinction. ;See Rochentr .White Lta<l Co. v. Rochulw, 3 N. Y. 
~3-· !ft IJo:ytJ v. Ma:yor, 'iic., of N~ Y.; s N.:Y. 3f9. the· court declined to 
assume th~ respon,SJOility of estab~g any' criteri~ saying it would deter-
. mjne as each case ar.oSe into which class it 1~ould falt. In Hoilgirs.r v. &;y 
City, 156 Mich. 687; ?Dd in /.01ffs v. SiOtU Cily, lSs Jpwa. u~ the c~rt1 
recognized the general rule,. but immediately iet out to avoid its effects. It 
·ii oftm difiicut~ to tell where one class of iiowers leaves off· and the· other 
begiias. An examination of the cases reveals ~ fact that the COU!f.S arc 
disincliDed to· draw too. s~ a line .so as to ~t municipat c:Orporation 
from liability to the dettiment of.private rights.' As yet no definite .test bu 
been formulated which 1w · ~ g~ly :adopted. · 
· MUNICIPAi. Q>m;>a.<\Tl'Ol,(~l.EtnNG CoYTRACTS TO ·J.owtsr BIDJ>F.L-
Where ilie charter of a city required that improvement contracts should be 
let to the lowest' l?i~der, rui<f the· clty invited bids requiring each bidder to 
furnish ·his ow specification;s fodany bard surface pavement, htld, that the 
proeeeding was.void,.aS t}tei'e was no direct.comp~tion on the baSis of·fµted 
SJ*ificatiQns ·as con~C!Jiplated bY. law. M011ta[l".-O'Rrilly Co. v. Milwaukee 
(Ore:. t5)a)}, I.93. Pac. Sat. . 
Tlie·object and.ptirpose of a statutory· provision ~.eqwririg work to be 
Jet to the IOwes't responsibie J;jddei' is to. insuie eompetition in· the I~ ot 
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contracts for public improvements. Noiional Stlrely Co. v. Kansas City 
Brick ·Co., 13 Kan. ig6. All contracts in which the publiC are int.crested 
wllich tend to prevent the competition required by statute are v-0id. Fi.thbwrr1 
v. City of Chicago, 171 IIL 338. There is a split of authority on ·the quc5tion 
whether bidding on. a· patented article allows the necessary competitiOIJ. In 
Teru1illiger l.and Co. v: Portland, 62 Ore. JOI, an ordinance inviting bids for 
the improvement of streets with Hassam Pavement, a patented process, was 
held .to be void. ··1n State v. Shau,,1ee County, s; Kan. 2fr/, the ·court held. 
that it was bardly ·intended by the law that the public should be barred from 
using· r~cnt inventions or obtaining bendicial improvements b~cause they 
were covered by an authorized patent or were the prodnct of exclusive man-
ufacture. Sec other cases and notes in s MICH. L RE\". -484. 4Bs. ;o8. With 
~ view for iitsuring the city both competition and the benefit of ·different 
processes, Judge Cooley he.ld that the kind of material is not rcqnired to be . 
determined in advance of ail'vertisemcnt for bids, saying that when bids are 
thus called ·for all bidders for a particular kind of pavement are bidders 
against all others in a certain sense. but .they are also bidde~s against .each 
other in a more particular s~se. .Atts. Gen. ex rel. Cook v. Detroit, a6 Mich. 
263. The courts usually hold that bidding on the basis of ·different kjnds of 
materials·is permissible.. Ballintore v. Flack, 104 MCl •. 107.; Scnxck v. Reading, 
186 Pa. 248. Sp.ecifications mbst be prepared in advance sufficiently ddlnite 
to en;i.ble· biddi:rs to preP.3re their bids intelligently. 20 .Ax. & F.Nf .. ENc. 
oF LAW 116;. Where the quantity of the work is not described in the speci-
fications, ·the c:.ontracfs made thereunder are wid. · W 'Us v. Bumham, a> 
Wis. n9; Cal: Imprw. Co. v. -Rcy11_olds. 123 Cal. 88. See 38 L. ~ A. (N. 
S.) 663. 
' . 
MUNICIPAi. CoRPORA't'JONS-51;.'F.CIAI. ASSESSMENTS OR JK~KF.NTS.-
.\\'here th"C landowners. on an island· were asS"CSsed for the CXJ>C°'~. of 3 ro~d- · 
,..;ay. established (In the mainland. where thrir ·proP;CrlY was irolated fr--0m 
and inacces51"bte to the "street and could only be reached by a bridge esti-
mated to cost a very large sum of the money: and tlte-building of whir.h was 
not contemplated in the near foture, ·li~ld, that the assessmel}.t was invalid · 
because the benefits were too r~mote. City of Seattle v. Peabody (Wash., 
1920), 192 Pac. g61. 
The expense of making improvements is very generally met in whole or 
in par.t by local assessmmts authorized to be made µP9Jl pttsons .or proi>ertY 
benefited or deemed to be benefited. 2 D11.i:.oN ON Mt!-NJCIPAL CoRPORATlO:iS 
[Jd ed.] 911. A legislative act 4escn"bing the community benefited will no~ 
be disturbed by the courts unless it is obviously erroneous .and arbitrary. 
Mullins v. Little Rock, 131 Ark. 1g8. The benefits which will 1ega1iz~ ali 
nssessment for the expense of a local improvement must be a present benefit 
immcd°iately accruing, and· speculative l>enefitc; which may never be reat!z<'ll 
are not sUfficient. Jn re W ,st Wheeler St., r;n ·wash. .66g. The question '"" 
to· what c:onstitutes a speculative benefit .~s caused 1he courts a gre:it deal. 
of d~ty. In Hull 'v. Chicago. 132 ·m 352. ihe sfrcet ra11 to 'the point 
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where a bridge would be built, if one: was ever constructed, and the pr6perty 
owners acr-0ss the river were not ltabie on the special assessment. Where. 
how.ever, 
0
the street wa.5 built ~o a place where the city copterIJplated builiiing 
a bridge in the near future and the street was built with the intention that 
such a bridge would be constructed, the property owners across the "river 
were.liable on the special assessment. Dickson v. Cit:; of Racine, 65. Wis. JOO; 
In the latter case the ·court said that it wobld be absurd to say that. the con· 
templated building of the bridge should have no effect in _estimating .benefits. 
In Chamberlain v. Cleveland, 34 Ohio St. 551, ·the court held that the "opming 
of one street rendering practicable that of another contemplated street which 
could not have been ·opened before might be cons~!lered in ~stimating the 
special benefits.. The probability that the city might in the future ·project a 
sewer to form a connection with the first sewer is too remote a benefit to be 
assessed. Slat~. N. J. R. R. v. Cits of Eli:;abeth, 37 N. ]. L. 330. Land which 
can tie drained into a tnmk sewer only after laterals are built cannot be 
assessed for the costs of the trunk until such JateraJs are constructed. Statt, 
Keliogg Br9s. v. Cit:; of !ili::abtth, 40 N. J. L. 274. ~ 28 Cvc.. U29-
NEcucENcE-Hous.:. GUEST A .MERE. LiaNi;u-L1ABIUTV oF HosT Fe>a 
lNJ11BIES Du.: TO SI.IP.PtRY Fx.ooRs.-Defen!Iant invited plaintiff and her hus--
ban·a io be guests at the ·house of the former on New Year's Eve and New 
Year's Day. They accepted, and while in the home of the defendant the 
pl~intiff was injured by the slipping of a small oriental rug on the polished 
hardwood floor.· . In at'Uon for damages, held, defendant not liable Green. 
fteld.v. Miller (Wis., 1921), I8o N; W. Su · 
Although there by invitation, plaintiff was not in law· m invitee but a 
mere licensee. The duty of an occupier to an invitee is of course not the 
same as to a licensee. though fu· the principal case on the facts the result 
probably would have been <he -same. In th.e case of a .licensee tht' 'XCUpier 
.owes a duty merety·to gi\·e wa~ing of any concealed danger of which he 
actually knows. SAI.KOSD ON TOR'JS [Stli Ed.}, § 122. For positive negli-
gence there would of course be liability, as, for· example, if the fiost were 
to drop carelf!isly a: tamp ·upon the· foot of . the guest. \>v"hite the licensee.· 
the social guest· is on the. premises solely by ·reason of the host's invitation, 
curiously in the view of the Jaw. it may be fairly sa.id that the latter has "no 
interest" in. ihe .matter. ''A licensee," says S~lmond; "may be defined tlS a 
person who enters the premises· by t&e· pei'inission of the occupier, grantt'rl 
gratuitously in a matter in which the_ occupier·h3s himself no interest."· Ii 
the host, however, "takes the guest ont fot a joy ride in an automobile 3nd, 
due to careless ·driving, he is injured, tht're may .be a recovery. Atitry v. 
Thompson (Me.), 103 At!. 4; Perkins ,;. Gallozr.:ay, 194 Ab. 265, L. R A. 
1916 E,· IJ!)C); .Massaletti v. Fit=ro)•, 228 Mass: 487 (if negligence is gross). 
B.u.t if the guest. fails to advise and, if n~essary, remonstrate from time to 
time regarding speed, 11tc.,. even though he rides on ~ baclc seat, he may 
be refused recovery on the ground of Cc.JJltributory_ negligence: · HOU!e "'· 
Cort:; (Wis., 1920), 179 N. W. 791, 19 M1cu. L REv. ~ The dec~on in 
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the principal case is in accord with the conclusion ·in So11throte v. Sto,.kv. 
J: H. & N. 274, Sec also Derby v. Railroad Co., 14 How. 4(18. 
PARTNERSHIP-Dun 'tO F.EtP AccoUNTS-:-lWTatATt P.AJtTNEL-Upon a 
bill for an accounting, the master found' that both partners· were illiterate. 
that no. systematic accounts of the firm business had ever been kept, and 
that while plaintiff was absent and defendant was in charge of the business 
the same method~ ·of bookkeeping were employed ·as thercto(orc. Held, 
dekndant not liable for failure to .keep _proper books of account. Paulette 
v. Cliainay (Mass., l92I), 129 N. E. 29Q. • 
'l:he universally rccogriized duty of partners to exercise toward eac~ 
other. the utmost good faith in ail their business dealings is· well stated by 
Bacon, V. C., in Belmore v. ·smith, 35 Ch. D. 436. 444- As a componen: part 
of the larger d~trine, every partn~r has the duty to sec that proper accounts 
arc kept of the partnership tr~sactions. · MECHDI, PART:sasmr. § u6. 
Failure of a partner to keep, or tc enable another designated partner or clCTk 
to keep, sµch a~ounts creates a presumption against the bona fides of such 
partner. Dimond v. Hen.tlerson, 47 -Wis. i12; Kelly v~ Greenleaf, 3 Story 
(U.:S. C. C.) .105. Btit such presumption may be rcl;>uttcd. Tallmadge v. 
Peno:>•er,·35· Barb: (N. ·Y.) 120; Garretson v. Braum, 185 Pa. St; 44;; Fer-
guson v: Wrlght, 61 Pa. St. 258. It was.held .in the principal case that· the 
presµmption was roouitcd by a showing that the· defendant did all that might 
reasonably have been expected of one in hi'I circumstances: And indeed such 
is. the general requirement. although it is often state«I in broader terms. The 
duty: imposed is in its very nature co-related -..ith the i}uestion (>f · motiv~ 
and should not be judged or measured by· a purely external standard. ·Chari-
ton v. Sloon, 76 "Ia. ·288. That this is true is shown by the case of Shoemaktf' 
v: ·shoemaker, 29. Ky. L Rep, 134, in which a partner was held not .liabie for 
employing a deficient SYSterµ of bookkeeping because the same system: had 
been used for a number.of years to tlie knowledge of the othtt partpers.and · 
without an§ obj~on from them. . · · 
Rel.£ JN SHEI.u;\"s CAst-ESTA.TES-Wll.LS.-Grantor convtyed to trus-
tees on trust for J for life, remainder the heirs Qf her body: Tru!'tces were 
given right actively to manage t~ estate during the life of J if they· thought· 
it. wise. Held, ·J o~ly took a lif~ estate' and the Rule in $helley's Case did 
not apply, since the life estate was an cquiJable estate, while the remainder 
·was. a· legal. estate •. ·Y9umans· v. Youm·a1'S''(S. C., l920h 105 S. E. 31 •. 
Gr..ntor conveyed to ·s for life, and after her death to her heirs in fee. 
Held, Rule in Shelley's Case applicable and S aequired an estate in fee sim-
ple.· Starling v. Newton (N. C., J~), lOS S. E. 3-
Testator devi~cd to M ·for life, remainder to the heirs of her .body law-
f~lly begotten; Held; Rule in Shcllct.s Cise.-did not apply, since from the 
whole instrument it appC3red tlie tes~t9r meant the remainder to go to the 
c;l1ildren of M. Blackledge v. Sitmnpns ·(N. C., 1920), IoS S. E. 202. 
These cases, decided within a month of eaeh other and reported in· the 
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same. series, are indicative of the ever recurring· d~isions ba.~ed upon .the 
feu~al rules of laVf commented on in 19 }41cH. L ~. ¢. The first of the 
cases ab~racted above was decided on the basis of technical rules of ancient 
origin as to the operation of the Statute of Uses; . while the third is mus-
trative of tPe lengths.a modem court will go in dt'cJaring mcdievai ruler. -inaP-
plicable to the f~ at hand, in spite of authority to the <:ontrary, where to 
apply the rule would ~feat .the' intentions· of the testator. ·The canons of 
. construction used and the fine distinctions· drawn, whereby the· words "heirs 
of her body lawfully begotten" were constructed as "children," would pro~ 
ably have appalled the judge~ who decided such ~scs as Jessa• v. Wnglll, 
2 Bligh. l, and Va• Grutten v. Farwell, [1897] App. Cas. 6s8. In George v: 
Morgan., 19· Pa. gs, the court held that the Rule. in ~helley's Case did apply 
to limitations exa"ctly similar to the estat'5 limited in ·the principal case. For 
a collection of _the authori~ies, see 29 L. R. A. (N. S.l g6,J. · 
TRrALS-M'ISCONi>UC'.l' OF ]U.RY-CoKKUNicATIOH AS BASIS OF NEW TRIM.. 
-.A conviction for murder had beeit affirmed in the supreme .court. An 
extraordinary motion for new trial was made by 'the defendant becau11e if 
was found that the jury, which then st(>Od ten for guil~ and two for guilty 
with recommendation for mercy, had requested the depn~ in charge to 
inform the judge that they could not agree and wished to go home. He did 
so, and told them that the judge would not release them,. adding that "the 
iucfa'~ wduld keep them lE>clcecl up unbl ·they did inake a verdict." In a few 
minu~es the jury brought in a verdict of guilcy. All save three of the jurors 
made affidavits that they were noflnfluenced by the deputy'.$ remark, amoug 
them· ~-e two who had voted for mercy. Held, motion sustained ~d judg-
·ment reversed; Harris ·v. State (Ga., 1920)", 104 S. E. §02.. 
. . This decisioll' represents the reduclio cul absurdum of maintenance -of the 
puricy of jpry trials. If an officer of the court· makes statements calciilated 
to influen.ce the. yerdiqt of ~he jury, it is- ground for a new trial. :'itatc v. 
LaGrange, 99 Io°wa. JO But if it does not appear that conduct had the effect 
pf forcing or infiuen fog ·the verdict, ~ere is no reason for granting a" new 
trial. . In ~ope. v. ~late, 36 Miss. 121, the bailiff, in jest, told the jury that 
uul~s they decided. one way or another they woold bave nothing to eat or 
cirmk. ~t was held that, although the remark was illegal, the only motive 
was for- coneurrence. and could not affect one patty or the other; that it 
1ras i:iot calculated to affect the delibera.tions of the jury. See civil ca..ces: 
1..eizch v. Willnlr, 9 All~ 212; Wiggins v. Dou'11er, 6'; How. Pr. 65. In Stolt 
v. Cady, 46 La. Ann. I~ the officer in .charge of the jury said that they had 
.better go to wo*1 for if they didn't ,!iecide the case the judge wpuld lode 
them up until Saturday, and it was held that this would not influence reason-
able men, ~d was not o( such· a natur~ ~f injury could fairly he presumed. 
A similar remark \vas made in Altxander v. State, 22 So. 871 (Miss.), where 
it w:as said that the integricy and indeP~dence of the jury could not be 
thought to he aff~ted by the servant's misconduct. Obear v." Gmy1 68 Ga. 
182, and_ Smith v. State, 122 Ga. I54, cited by the court in the priilci~l case 
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are not authority for the position of the court. In the first cue the,t was . 
some evidence that the jury, worn oqt, ha! "futed up., a verdict; a'so, tbq 
had been allowed to separate and go out to ~ public resort. In the latter 
case the bailiff had taken the jury out for a vieyt of the loett.r, .unknown 
to counsel in the case. In Rnifroe v. State, 13 Ga. App. 6ss. cited b.r the 
court, after the jury had been out eighteen hours ~e bailiff said that thq 
should not make a mistrial, as the. judge was conscientiously opposed to 
them. The court seems to lay down the rule that the plaintiff in error shoakl 
show injury, unless misconduct of the jilry is shown or it appears they ba..e 
been unduly interfered with, when -there is a presumption of injury; bat this 
presumption may be affirmatively rebutted. ~ new trial was granted. It ·is 
submitt~ that the principal case goes so far beyond any n~sity of prt-
sei:ving the purity of jury trial as actually to do injustice. As Dean Pomad 
has said, "The individual gets so much fair play that the public sets 'YerJ 
little." Compare with the principal case the case of Peofle Y.-Pyle. J8s Pac. 
1019 cru, 1919), in which a bystander bad said, in the pre~ce of jurors. 
to defendant's attorney, that he would ''fix" the defendatit, who had :"beat" 
him oµt of some money •. It was held that in the absence of a showing ~ 
the verdict had been influenced it was no abuse of discretion to deny a new 
triat, "unless ~e go out into the thin ·air. of metaphysics far inspiration and 
wholly disregard the ample ~dence. indel>endently· of .. tM alleged 1tate-
ments, to sustain the verdict of the jury and arbitrarily hold·-tpa~ such aUc&ed 
statements prQbably influenced the verdict, rhe defendant's contentiou can 
find no support." See State v. Harp«, IOI N. C. 7.61, 9 Am St. Rep. i{J;_ 
State ·v~ Burto,.; 172 N. C. 9J9. 
TausTS-REsUL'tINC TRUST os HusBAND's Puacn.\sE OF I.AND Aia Cox-
VEYANC£ TO Wm: NM' DtsTRoYED BY HER v~ AcaU:1i1ENT TO HOLD ·Tnu 
FO:a His Us~-The defendant purchased land with.his own funds and had 
it conveyed to his wife on her J;iarol promiSe to bold "the title for bis-use ud 
make such conveyancei. as he should desire. . Upon ~eparation from her Ji.. 
band twenty years later the wife brought ciectment jor the Wid. Hell. the 
presumption of a gift to the wife being overcome by the eviderice of her· 
oral agreement, there iS a resulting trust m favor of the husband. ·Jochn 
v. Jackson (Ga., 1920), 104 S. E. aafJ. · . 
. Since the so-called resulting trust is f>as~ u~ an intention implied in 
Jaw, it would -seein illogical to decree a resulting trust in the face of an 
actual intention expressed in an oral agreement.· An artificial presumptiod · 
of intention is inconsistent with an actual intention. The trust beinc an 
oral one and unenforceable: because of the Statute of Frauds, relief ·should 
be sought on the theory of a ronstructive ·trust. "This is.the 'View of Dean 
t\mcs in 20 HARV. L. REv. 549, and Professor Co~tigan in :q H.uv. L. Rn. . 
437 •. It is noteworthy that the court in the instant ease recognized the·JQsic 
of this p!]Sition .. though it. felt constrained to adhere· to the prevaiJmc ~ 
that the trust is still resulting if the oral agreement is not differeat fr'oa" 
that which would ·be implied if the grantee were legally a stran&er. ~ •· 
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Mechem, 147 Ala. 405; Ba"ou·s v. Bohan, 41 Conn. 278; Smithso.niarr /Im. v. 
Afuch, l(is> U. S. 398. Other courts have discarded this view a~ unsound, at 
least to the eX'tcnt of holding that an oral prcimise to- the one paying the 
consideration takes the ose out of the catrgory of resulting trusts, and that, 
in the absence of fraud, no trui..t will be imposed. .~fu!long v. SchneiJtr. JSS 
Ia. 12; Chapman v. Chapman, 114 Mich. 144; Joh11son v. JolmsC1n, 16 llinn. 
512. This result, while logically correct so far as the principle underlying 
resulting Crusts is concerned, seems to overlook th~ prevention of the unjust 
enrichment principle upon which a decree of constructive trust might prop. 
erly l?e" based. It i$ to he noted that; if the view ct'ntended for by Dean 
Ames and Professor Costigan is adopted to its full extent, the .courts must 
recognize not only that the trust is not resulting but that the me«: repudia· 
tion of the promise is sufficient fraud upon which to found a ceonstructh;e 
· trust. Otherwise, in man.J cases where relief is now granted on a sesulting 
trust theory there could be no reli~f if the trusf \verc regarded as construc-
tive. This would be the result in states where actual fraud is required to 
raise a constructive trust. Skahns v. /ruing, 2o6 IIL 597; Lancaster v. 
Spinger, 239 Ill 4;,l. It is not -infrequently held that the mere repudiation· 
of an oral agreement, made in good faith, i~ not fraud. Temey v. HlJUYJrd, 
79 Oat. 575; J.lcClai" v. McClain, 57 Ia. 167; Tagtt -v •• Tagte, J4 Minn. zp. 
Unless the courts arc prepared to bold that fraudulent retention justifies a 
C9nstructivc trust, they arc forced to deny relief except on a resulting trust 
theory. The additional step woul~ seem to be warranted, however, not only 
because of the more effective Justice which coul.J be rendered but because it 
would place ~i: cases upon an und~iably sound and logically correct basis. 
The simple admission in the instant case that the trust cnforced.tberc.shoald 
Jog;cally be a constnictive rather than a rei:ulting trust is a step·in the right 
direction. 
VENDOR. AND Pl"RC:HASnt-RIGUTS OF PARTlltS WH£RF. PRltMlSES ARI: DAK-
AGJ:tD.-Plaintiff had contracted with defrndant to sell him property with 
st~es on it, conveyance to be made on a certain date. DefcncJant bad paid 
a small part of the purchase price. Before the time for CODVey'"dJlce, without 
the fault of the vendor, the wall of the building containiog four stores f~ 
~ the proiierty substantialJy. Cross suits iii equity were instituted, 
for specific perfor.nance and for repayment of the part payment, respectively." 
Held. that the Joss. must fall on the ~endor. I.ibmars v. I.nmuo11, 1.nlnssDfl 
v.,Libmars (YasS., 1920). 138 N. E. 13- · 
The prevailing rule in the United States is that the risk is on the vendee, 
since he is considered in equity as the real owner of -the property. ·Brtfl>W 
v. Htrbm. 30 Md. 30J; Sm1tli v. Undtrlaill, 197 N. Y. 168, 8 MICH. L Rtv. 
sis; Nt~ Rtalo"Co. v. Jxdgt, 176 N. Y. Supp. 133; see Mandn. v. 
li"mphreys, 98 S. E. 259- Unless the contr:lct is tmenforcable by the ven~or 
at time of loss, as where he bas not obtained title. AmurtclsoJS v. St11trMJa. J'° N. W. 63J. A supporting argument is tbai since any incr~se of Value 
bc;longs to the ~endee, Frick's Appeal, 101 Pa. St. ~S. the risk of foss should 
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also fall there. See Brewer v. Herbert and Neporuil Reall:y Co. v. Jtld~e. 
supra. Professor Williston answers this by saying that in the case of loss 
the thing itself is changed in nature, admitting that increase belongs to the 
vendec. WILUSTON ON CcNTRACTS, § 951. But suppose the premises were 
residt:ntial property on which oil was subHqnently discovered. Would not 
the na:ture of the subject matter be changed also? The Mas9chusetts court 
in the principal ca5e makes the rule for equity the same as the rule for law. 
Wells v. Calnan, 10'/ MltSs. 514;. following dicta in Thompson v. ~ould, ao 
Pick. IJ4, where the contract wa~ unenforceable because of the Statute of 
Frauds. It would be ccmvenient to have the same rule both ·in law and 
equity. But if the rule at law be so crystallized that it cannot be changed, 
there ~ no reason for making the equity rule, which, it is submitted, is a 
juster rule, conform to it. The court in the principal case says notl-.ing about 
possession. Professor Williston recommends that the rule should he. that 
the risk should pass upon transfer of possession, on the theory that the inten-
tion of the parties is that the prop"erty is to pass at a future time, not neces-
sarily the time for conveyance, and that if the vendee :S given immediate 
right to possession title is retained as security for paymcnt,-a short way of 
accomplishing the same result as a mortgag~ back on conveyance. WILLIS-
~N ON CoNTRACTS, § 940- There is support for the possession theory; "ee 
Good v. Jarrard, 93 S. C. 229i St'Wcll v. U11dtrlrill, sutra (where the court 
,ays that there is the addCd fact that. purchaser was in possession). But ~ 
is submitted that if possession of the vendee is a short way of accomplishing 
a "mortgage," so is a land contract a short way of getting rid of the risk ot 
loss on the part of the vendor, and of assuming the chance of inert.a~ in 
value on the part of the vcndec. Incidentally, possession of the v=dor stib-
sequcnt to tbe contract may be rcir~,.ded as a high form of seeurity, which 
the parties surely can accomplish by their contract. The fact that the vendor 
usually will have prop.:rty of his ovm on the premises, when he is in po!ses-
sion, is surely enough 'o guarantee that he will bestow reasonable care. See 
discussicn by Dean Pound, and cases cited. in 33 HARV. L. Rtv. 813, 326-827. 
Wo:itKH£N's CoKPENSATION-Aocro£NT .AltisING OUT oF EMPLOYM£NT--
Sl<1I<TIV£ Acr oF C<>-£HPLOY££.-Applicant's intestate, while devoting his time 
to his work, was killed by the sportive act of a co-employee in shooting air 
at a high pressure into bis body per rtctsim by means of a compressed air 
hose used in the einployment. Held, not an accident "arising out of the 
employment;" within the Workmen's Compens:ition Act. Payne v. lnt!sistrial 
Comm. (111., 1920), 129 N. E. 122. 
On the general subject of liability under Workmen's Compensation 'Laws 
for sportive acts· of fellow servants, see note- to Leonbru110 v. Champlain 
Silk Mills, 1.28 N. E. 7n, in 19 Mies. L .Rtv. 456. The opinion in the prin-
cipal case places considerable emphasis upon the lack of actual knowledge 
by the employer of use of the air hose for horseplay. Bu~ qua~re, whetlier 
such actions were not "reasor.ably to· be expected," under the doctrine of 
the case aove cited, especially since the employees involved were only 15 to 
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J7 ;rears.of age. Accord with the principal case, see F•deral RNbber .Vfg. 
Co. v. HoVol~. 162 Wis. 341; Ballard's Adm.'z v. Ry. Co., 128 Ky. 826; Ta'1-
tw .'Y. Westtnf-Mott Co.,~ Mich. ZJS. Contrti, Robinson v • .Melville Affg. 
Co.,· 16s N. C. ~ The case of J,. re Loper (Ind., 1917), u6 N. E. 324. 
·would seem to.be.distinguishable on the ground that the employer knew of 
·ihe prac_tice of ·committing. pranks with the air hose. 
WouoiEN's Coxa'isAnoN-l.IAB1LITY oF ExPLOYiR FOR UNsJWFW. 
TuATlll!NT ·OF ExPt.oYEE Bi' PsvsmA -s.-Employee fractured biS leg and 
·was taken by bis employer to a hospital, where the leg was set. The union 
of ~e fracture was made by 9verlapping ~e fragment<i .. making the leg four 
inc;hes shorter; To correct· this vicious uniQn the employee ~d the usual 
·operation performed, but no union ·then took place, and from necessity the 
· Jes wu imputateb. In a. claim for comj>ensation, held, the employee suffered 
the J01s of a leg as a result of bis injuries and was entitltd to compeDsatfon 
·for that 1GS!L Booth & Flinn v. Coole (Okla., 1920), 193 Pac. 36. 
Where dea~ .or an aggravation of the injucy results to the -empleyee 
from ~ operation or medical treatment ma.Je necessary by ·an injury, the 
questi0n is often raised as to the liability of the employer. In cases whete 
the. medical attendant is guilty of neither negligence nor malpractice, ·the 
courtS appear to concur in making the employer. compensat~ for that death 
or agr&Yation. ·Thus. where a w.orlcman died from the effects of ~ opera· 
tiaa conducted slci1fully. it was· found that he was injured hy an accident 
making the operation necessary and that death resulted from an injury, and 
comi>esisation was given accordingly. · Lnd, .v. ·Pon of Londo• A•tlscirilit.s 
[1914), W. C. a: Ins. Rep. ~ So,· too, where an iojWY. to the employee'• 
finger caused gangrene. making two .operations necessary, and the !econd 
op;eration,, conducred. skilfully, resulted in pneumonia caused by 'the anaes-
thetic, ~ was held that the accidental injury was the proximate cause .of 
~eath imCt compelisati(m was granted. Favro v: Board. of P11blic Library 
· Tr.Mn~tl, I Cal. Ind.· A.et:.. Com. Dec. I. And whezrc: an em.pl<>yee's arm was 
~ _by a saw. aecessitating. an· immediate operation without time to prepare 
the pati4'Slt for ether, and u a result he contracted ether pneumonia and died, 
~was siftll. · 1,. rt Raymod, Mass. Work's Comp. Rep. (1913) 
211.r Where the malpractice of the· medical attendant causes death or aggi:a-
fttes the inj11r7 of the employee, a· few cMes, including the English decisions, 
do not hold the efuptoyer liable for such increase of incapacity. Thus, where 
the employee broke his arm ancl, owing to unskilful medical treatment at a 
hospital to which bis employer Sent him, bis arm did not and could not com-
ptetOty ruover, the employer wu not held liable for the ds1cilfuJ treatment 
.and cOmpensation for this further injury was denied. Della Rocca v. S1anle3 
°J01ftl & Co., 6 ~. C. .C. A 6zt. .The court there based its decision.on the 
ground that' the injury resulting from the 'malpractice cannot be traced back 
. to the first inju"ry, but a new agency, malpractice. had intervened, for which 
·the empJ07tt is not liable. ·Iii Yiita v. Fleming, 132. Minn. 128, the que!tion 
arose whetb~ settJrment by the employer, reJeasirig himself fr~m all claims 
. -
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on account of the injury, also released the defendant doctor from liability 
for malpractice. It was held that the employer was not liable for disability 
caused by the negligence of the doctor, and so the settlemeht did not extin-
guish the employee's claim against the doctor for malpractice. But the 
great weight of authority, that the employer is liable for the results oi 
malpractice, seems the better view. Thus, it has been held that an employer 
failing to provide medical attention is liable to compensat~ for the Joss of 
an employee's eye caused by the negligence and incompetence of a practitioner 
$elected by the employee. Sto,kwtll v. Wc;rmirt, .I Cat. Ind. Acc. Com. Dec. 
(part :z) 225· At common law the empfoyer was not liable to an injured 
employee for the negligence or malpractice of a physician called by the 
employ~, if be was not negligent in selecting an incompetent physician. 
Boring v. C/si,ago R. Co., no N. E.. 54S. But liability under the Compensa-
tion Acts is not based upon negligence. The theory of the ~ct is that :Ojuriea· 
are an element of the cost of production and should be charged to the indus-
try. ·So whenever the immediate agency. causin~ death or further injurr it 
one which the first injury made it necessary to employ, the employer should 
be compelled to compensate for the resulting death or further i:ljury. The 
principal case is in acc0rd with this doctrine and rests upon the better reaion-
ing. Even where. the employee bad rejected the medical treatment offered. 
by the employer, nevertheless the employer waS held liable for Jung trouble 
aused by the negligence ~f a physician Chosen by the employee. Salualor• 
v. Nftll England Cast10lly Co., 2 CaL Jncl. Acc. Comm.· Dec. 3SS. the court 
saying: "An industry i9 liable for alt legitimate consequences. following an 
accident, among which consequences affecting the extent of the disability 11 
the possibility of error of judgment or unskilfutneu on the part of an). 
.attending physician, whether called by the empl01er or employee."' 
